OUTSIDE DIRECTOR TRADING BEHAVIOR AROUND SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

• 발행기관: People & Global Business Association
• 저자명: Joseph M Goebel
• 간행물 정보: 『Global Business and Finance Review』Vol.8 No.2, 23~38쪽, 전체 16쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경영학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2003.12.31

영문 초록

While outside director board concentration (ODBC) Levels have risen, research Looking into the role that outside directors (OD) play in aligning shareholder and managerial interests has been inconclusive. This paper addresses the issue of OD effectiveness through focusing more fundamentally upon their allegiance as evidenced by the trading patterns of OD surrounding an event widely associated with declining shareholder wealth - the seasoned equity offering. Not only. do OD significantly increase net sales in response to the offering, they tend to more highly concentrate their net sales before the offering than all other insiders and inside directors. Further, the concentration of net sales activity by OD is most prevalent in firms with the highest ODBC levels, suggesting that rising ODBC Levels as a means to more effectively influence management as shareholders would prefer are misguided.

목차

Abstract

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

CONCLUSIONS

REFERENCES