Standard Auctions with Security Bids

• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Jinwoo Kim
• 간행물 정보: 『JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS』Vol.24 No.1, 54~71쪽, 전체 17쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2013.03.31

영문 초록

Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) study auctions where bidders compete in securities. As the main results, they show that: a steeper security generates a higher revenue for the seller; the revenue ranking between the first-price and second-price auction depends on the steepness of security; and the first-price auction combined with call option achieves the highest revenue among a general set of auction mechanisms. As pointed out by Che and Kim (2010), using steeper securities can cause the adverse selection problem and reduce the seller's revenue, in case a bidder who expects a higher return must incur a higher investment cost. While the analysis of Che and Kim (2010) focuses on the second-price auction, this paper analyzes the first-price auction to show that it is plagued by the same problem and in fact more vulnerable than the second-price auction to the adverse selection problem, which may lead to a reversal of the DKS's revenue ranking between the two auctions.

목차

Abstract

1. INTRODUCTION

2. MODEL

3. RANKING SECURITY DESIGNS

4. RANKING AUCTION FORMATS

APPENDIX

REFERENCES

키워드

Auctions Security design Adverse selection