On the Coincidence of the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus in Queueing Problems

• 발행기관: 서울대학교 경제연구소
• 저자명: Youngsub Chun Toru Hokari
• 간행물 정보: 『Seoul Journal of Economics』Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 20 No.2, 223~237쪽, 전체 14쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2007.06.30

영문 초록

Given a group of agents to be served in a facility, the queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve agents and the (positive or negative) monetary compensations they should receive. As shown in Maniquet (2003), the minimal transfer rule coincides with the Shapley value of the game obtained by defining the worth of each coalition to be the minimum total waiting cost incurred by its members under the assumption that they are served before the non-coalitional members. Here, we show that it coincides with the nucleolus of the same game. Thereby, we establish the coincidence of the Shapley value and the nucleolus for queueing problems. We also investigate the relations between the minimal transfer rule and other rules discussed in the literature.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Preliminaries

Ⅲ. Queueing Games

Ⅳ. Coincidence of the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus

Ⅴ. Discussion

Ⅵ. Concluding Remarks

References

키워드

Queueing problems Minimal transfer rule Shapley value Nucleolus Coincidence