지방공공재의 분권적 공급과 경제적 효율성에 관한 이론적 고찰

• 영문명: Economic Efficiency, and Decentralized Provision of a Local Public Good under Stackelberg Fiscal Interactions
• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: 김정민(Jung Min Kim)
• 간행물 정보: 『재정논집』재정논집 제15권 제1호, 57~80쪽, 전체 24쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2000.08.31

영문 초록

This paper in vestigates whether strategically competing municipalities can ensure efficient provision of local public goods when they behave as either a Stackelberg leader or a follower. After providing the implications of equilibrium under the assumption of free mobility of consumers and a Stackelberg structure, this paper shows that municipalities acting as either a Stackelberg leader or a follower may over-provide or under-provide local public goods, that is, the efficiency in the provision of public goods is not guaranteed. A theory for testing the Tiebout hypothesis has been developed from the decision rules for both a leading and following municipalities. Efficiency would be obtained only if property value is invariant to the level of public service.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 분석모델

Ⅲ. 비교정태분석

Ⅳ. 지방공공재 공급에 관한 의사결정

Ⅴ. 요약 및 결론

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