군비통제 검증기구 구성ㆍ운영방안(Ⅱ) - 남북간 군비통제를 위한 검증기구 개선문제를 중심으로

• 영문명: The Institutional and Legislative Aspect of Verification on Inter-Korean Arms Control - Focused on the Issue of Establishing and Operating Our New Governmental Institutions for Arms Control Verification -
• 발행기관: 중앙대학교 법학연구원
• 저자명: 제성호(Seong-Ho Jhe)
• 간행물 정보: 『법학논문집』법학논문집 제26집 제2호, 279~308쪽, 전체 30쪽
• 주제분류: 법학 > 법학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2002.11.01

영문 초록

  Verification is one of the most difficult, important and complicated issues in the process of arms control. Verification is not just a technical, military issue but a complex process involving economic, financial and political dimension as well. Despite the complexity and importance of verification, there has been little in-depth studies about verification; its concept, nature, functions, and its specific methods and strategy. Particularly, there has been almost nothing on the domestic, institutional aspect of verification.   This study is concerned with the domestic institutional aspect of verification. As a result of the inter-Korean summit and consequent resumption of dialogue between North and South Korea, there has been growing interests for verification as an essential process of arms control. Against this backdrop, the study intends to focus on the issue of verification, in particular what should be the most effective and efficient domestic system to implement the task of verification and what legislations are required to this effect.   Verification, in general, has at least four functions. These functions include: first, insurance against Significant surprise or "breakout" (in other words, sudden unilateral abrogation of an existing agreement); second, confidence-building between the adversaries; creation of political support for arms control; and fourth, guidance for drafting better arms control treaties.   Our approach to verification in the North-South arms control negotiation should bear these four functions in mind. In particular, the following four principles should be stressed. First, despite North Korea"s negative attitude toward verification in general, any arms control agreements with North Korea must include an effective verification provision, without which they cannot obtain the needed domestic support. Second, however, it is important for the South to be flexible about the specific methods of verification, given North Korea"s sensitivity to verification. Third, gradualism and pragmatism should be a guiding principle in negotiation on verification. Too ideal or ambitious approach to verification, such as demanding a strict form of challenge inspection in the absence of minimal element of confidence, can easily lead to the collapse of arms control negotiation. Fourth, no efforts should be spared to obtain the domestic support for the relevance and validity of the adopted arms control methods.   What kind of domestic institutional mechanism is needed in deciding and implementing verification strategy? There can be two kinds of approach to this question. First is to make use of the existing standing committee of National Security Committee (NSC), which requires no new legislation or establishment of new institution. The standing committee of NSC would be in charge of arms control and verification affairs which involve and affect the interests of various government department and agencies.   The second approach is to set up the Arms Control Commission under the office of Prime Minister, and let this commission in charge of planning, deciding, and implementing arms control matter. This option obviously requires new legislation, but such new institution may be useful when arms control would become a serious, real issue.   Finally, whichever option is adopted, the current Office of Arms Control and Verification and Inspection Agency within the Ministry of Defence should be strengthened and restructured when North-South arms control proceeds in earnest.

목차

Ⅳ. 남북간 군비통제 검증기구 운영 및 구성방안
Ⅴ. 결론
〈ABSTRACT〉