한국의 핵농축 권한에 대한 소고

• 영문명: A Study on South Korea’s Right to Enrich
• 발행기관: 고려대학교 공공정책연구소
• 저자명: 이병철(Lee Byong-Chul)
• 간행물 정보: 『Journal of North Korea Studies Journal of North Korea Studies』Vol.6 No.2, 5~22쪽, 전체 18쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정책학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2020.12.31

영문 초록

Securing the right to enrich is, in essence, a necessary proposition as a sovereign state. While there are no current international laws prohibiting uranium enrichment and reprocessing for peaceful purposes, the United States strictly bans enrichment and reprocessing through the bilateral nuclear agreement. As the majority of South Korea’s prominent politicians and the vast majority of South Korean nuclear experts believe that a nuclear bomb would in the long term be a threat to their national interests, South Korea has ever maintained its stance that the 1992 denuclearization joint statement with North Korea, in addition to the nuclear cooperation pact with the United States remains valid. South Korea acknowledges that possession of nuclear weapons would provide only a short-term regional advantage that would turn into a longer-term vulnerability, because sooner or later, Japan, which many nuclear pundits claim is on the threshold of a de-facto nuclear-armed state in many respects, would follow suit and a regional nuclear arms race would be inescapable. The technical choices South Korea has made in the configuration of the nuclear program demonstrate a strong preference for a robust enrichment capability rather than for a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability. Given that South Korea’s development program is focused on next-generation technology in terms of nuclear export, it is time to consider how to obtain the right to enrich, including the possibility of nullifying the dead-on-arrival 1992 denuclearization declaration.

목차

Ⅰ. 문제제기: 국제사회의 제약과 국내적 선택의 상호작용

Ⅱ. 핵무기용 핵물질의 규범적 논의

Ⅲ. 농축에 대한 미국의 이중적 태도

Ⅳ. 원자력의 평화적 이용과 한국의 전략적 선택

Ⅴ. 2015년 협정 실패 원인과 장애물

Ⅵ. 결론: 양자 협정의 안정적 진화 대 불확실한 농축 도전

참고문헌

키워드

Nuclear Enrichment R.O.K.-U.S Atomic Agreement Nonproliferation